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Report on the causes of, and circumstances attending, the 
explosion which occurred at Cardowan Colliery, Lanarkshire, on 
25th July, 1960 
The Right Honourable Richard Wood, M.P., 
Minister of Power. 
SIR, 
I.-[l\'TRODUcnO 
20th December, 1960. 
(I) In accordance with your direction given under the terms of Section 12 1 
of the M ines and Quarries Act, 1954, I have the honour to submit my report 
on the causes and circumstances of the accident which occurred at Cardowan 
Colliery in the County of Lanark on the 25th July, 1960, shortly before 7 p.m. 
when three persons were killed and seven others injured, one of them so 
seriously that he died on the 3 1st July, 1960. 
(2) The accident was due to an explosion which occurred during operations 
following the breaking open of stoppings erected some months previously to 
seal ofT an underground fire. Sections lV, V and V I  of this report describe. 
respectively. the fire which broke out on 29th January, 1960, and the method 
of sealing it off; the attempt to re-open the area affe cted by the fire; and the 
explosion. Section VI I  discusses the air samples which were taken after the 
seals were broken until the time of the explosion, and Section vrll comments 
on the planning of the re-opening operations_ 
n.-DESCRIPTION OF THE COLUERY 
(3) eardowan Nos. I and 2 Colliery is situated at Stepps in the County of 
Lanark about five miles north-east of Glasgow_ It produces a daily output of 
approximately 1,500 tons of coal from four seams, the Meiklehill Main, the 
Meikleltill Wee, the Cloven and the Kilsyth Coking Coal. The latter, in wltich 
the explosion occurred, lies at a depth of approximately 700 yards from the 
surface_ The mine is served by two shafts, No_ 1 the downcast and No_ 2 the 
upcast. In addition a third shaft, No. 3, has been sunk to a depth 0[700 yards 
for the future development of the colliery but its existence has no bearing on 
this accident_ During normal working prior to the accident a total of some 
1,400 men were employed underground and 250 on the surface. The mine is 
gassy and safety-lamps are used tltroughout the workings_ It is ventilated by 
a double inlet Sirocco fan situated on the surface at No_ 2 Pit, which before the 
fire in January circulated a total quantity of 450,000 cubic feet of air per minute 
with a water gauge of 5-14 inches. 
(4) The mine has a history of heavy gas emission. An explosion of firedamp 
occurred in No. 2 Shaft while i t  was being sunk in 1927, a second explosion 
occurred in 193 1 while an underground fire in the Meiklehill Main Coal was 
being sealed off, and a third, in which I I men were killed, occurred in 1932 in 
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the same seam. This latter explosion was the subject of a formal investigation 
under Section 83 of the Coal Mines Act, 191 1 ,  conducted by Sir Henry Walker, 
then H.M. Chief .Inspector of Mines, and a report Cmd. 4309 was published 
in 1933. 
(5) The colliery is situated in the No. 3 (Central West) Area of the Scottish 
Division of the National Coal Board. The Colliery Manager was J .  MacMaster 
and there were three undermanagers of whom J. B. Henderson was in charge 
of the part of the mine where the accident occurred. The Group Manager was 
W. G.  Neilson, one of the injured persons; the Deputy Area Production 
Manager (Operations) J. Lawrie; the Area Production Manager J .  R. Cowan; 
and the Area General Manager D. Lang. 
llI.-THE NORTH SlOE COK[NG COAL 
(6) The explosion occurred in the Kilsyth Coking Coal in No. 4 East 
District which lies to the north of the shafts. A big upthrow fault runs 
approximately east and west about 200 yards to the north of the shafts and the 
seam was developed beyond this from a pair of large stone drifts which were 
driven across it on a ri�ing inclination. The seam was \\orked by a series of 
loog\\all faces to right and left of the main development which was pressed 
forward in an approximately north-easterly direction (see plan) . The coal was 
undercut and filled on to belt conveyors on the face which in turn delivered on 
to gate belts and thence on to a trunk bell in the main imake with the loading 
point in the vicinity of No. 2 Wesl Junction. At the time of the fire in January 
the only face being worked was No, 4 East. The face of No. 3 West had been 
cut out by a fault and a new face was in process of being won out beyond it, 
while another new face was being opened up along its right-hand ribside, The 
main developing face going to the north had been rising on an ever increasing 
gradient beyond No. 4 East and it had been standing for a considerable time 
before the fire occurred, Of the old roads on the east side access was maintained. 
through ventilation doors, to No. I East where a borehole had been put down 
into the Hurlet Seam and had been connected to the methane drainage pipe 
system, No. 2 East Intake was maintained right down to the old face line 
'" here a pump was situated in order to deal with a make of water said to amount 
to 30 gallons per minute. The intake and return of No. 3 East were also 
acce�sible. On the west side the old roads leading into No. I West had been 
sealed with stoppings but the roads into No, 2 and No. 3 West were maintained 
and ventilated with a view to re-opening the faces beyond the fault. The return 
on the left-hand side of the old north face was sealed up just above its junction 
with the return from No, 3 West but a flow of air had been maintained up the 
intake and down the right-hand return, the amount being controlled by a 
regulator in the latter, 
(7) The Kilsyth Coking Coal is notoriously gassy and at this colliery the 
emission amounted to 1,060 eubic feet per ton. In order to improve the quality 
of the ventilation a system of methane drainage had been adopted and firedamp 
was being extracted from the roof of the left-hand return of No, 4 East. The 
gas drainage pipes were laid in the return airway and up  the Upcast Shaft. 
(8) Air measurements taken during December, 1959, in the ordinary course, 
before the fire showed that 46,300 cubic feet of air per minute were passing into 
the North Side Coking Coal Districts. Of this, 12,600 cubic feet per minute 
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entered No. 4 East Intake with 7,300 cubic feel per minute coming back out 
the right-hand return (which was regulated) and 5,000 cubic feet per minute 
out the left-hand return. Firedamp determinations taken at the same time 
showed 0·15 per cent. in the left-hand return and 0·43 per cent. in the 
right-hand return. 
(9) No. 4 East District consisted of  a double unit longwall conveyor face 
approximately 200 yards in length and 27 inches in height. The coal was 
undercut at floor level by a chain machine to a depth of 4 feet 6 inches and 
filled on to face belts which were fire resistant. The face belts delivered at the 
centre (intake) road head on to a gate belt. Al l the machinery was electrically 
driven. The face had advanced some 300 yards to the east at the time of  the 
fire. The roof at the face was supported by wooden props and lids and strip 
packs were built in the wastes. A stone dust barrier \\as installed in 0.4 East 
Intake between the air crossing and the Trunk Road. 
rY.-THE UNDERGROUND FLRE ON 29TH JANUARY, 1960 
(10) On the 29th January, 1960, while coal cutting was in progress on the 
left-hand side of the face in No. 4 East District in the Coking Coal, firedamp 
was ignited in the undercut. All attempts to extinguish the res).llting fire, \\ohich 
had spread on to both sides of  the face and in which the coal, gummings and 
wooden props were involved, pro\'ed unavailing, and after several �mall 
explosions of firedamp had occurred in the waste, the workmen engaged in 
fire-fighting had to be withdrawn. To smother the fire seals had to be built 
and these were put in at the lower (out bye) ends of the two Mone drift.:; which 
gave access to the North Side Coking Coal Districts. The intake seal was 
situated at a distance of 1,420 yards out from the face. The area enclosed by 
the seals rapidly filled with firedamp and such was the make of gas that a total 
volume of  more than 40 million cubic feet of methane was drained off from 
behind the seals during the time they were in position. 
(11) In the early part of June, 1960, it was considered that the time would 
soon arrive when the workings in the North Side Coking Coal could safely be 
recovered and it was during these recovery operations that the explosion 
occurred. Immediately after the survivors had been rescued and the three 
bodies recovered, the seals were replaced because of the risk of  further 
explosions and the district has not been re-opened since. It has not been 
possible, in consequence, to investigate thoroughly either the fire in January or 
the explosion in July. 
V.-TIfE ATTEMPT TO RE-OPEN THE NORTH S£DE orSTRICTS 
(12) After the fire in No. 4 East had been sealed off for five months, it \\as 
elt that it would then be safe to re-open the district while the pit was idle for 
he annual holidays in the latter part of July. Samples taken from behind the 
seals from the bottom of the drifts had shown that the atmosphere had rapidly 
come extinctive once the seals were completed and it was felt that sufficient 
time had elapsed to allow all heated material to cool off sufficiently so tbat it 
ould not re-ignite when exposed to the normal atmosphere. 
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(13) il was estimaled Ihat a volume of li to 2 million cubic feet of methane 
was contained behind the seals and this had to be swept out, diluted to a 
harmJcss concentration and removed to the surface by restoring the ventilation. 
An operation of this nature and magnitude obviously caUs for careful and 
detailed planning beforehand. The potential risk of disaster is indeed ever 
present until the last of the gas has gone. 
(14) The two stoppings at the bottom of the drifts presented a somewhat 
unusual problem. JL was known that the atmosphere immediately behind them 
was practically pure methane and they had been strengthened with masonry 
walls, together with injections of considerable quantities of neat cement. Any 
attempt to remove the stoppings by manual labour was out of the question 
because or the risk of igniting gas by sparking from tools, and because of the 
risk, particularly at the return stopping, that the workmen might become 
enveloped in an irrespirable atmosphere. After extensive enquiries and 
consultations with experts it was decided to breach the seals by blasting, the 
charges being fired electrically from the surface while no one was underground. 
In order to cn ure that the gas could not come into contact with the explosive 
while it \\as being fired, considerable quantities of water were pumped through 
the stoppings, and the drifts behind them filled to such an extent that there was 
a head of water of at least five feet above the tops of the seals. The seals were 
safely, though only partially, breached when the charges were fired at 10.40 a.m. 
on Saturday. 16th July. Inspection later in the day showed that a hole had in 
fact been blown through the return seal but that the wall on the inbye side of 
the intake seal was only cracked. The latter was not really opened up until 
2 a.m. on Sunday, 17th July, when the fractured brickwork was pushed over 
with a hydraulic prop. 
(15) Before operations started the National Coal Board"s Divisional Mobile 
Laboratory was brought to the colliery and in addition air sampling apparatus 
was set up in the electricians shop. This enabled samples to be analysed 
immediately they were brought to the surface and the results were in the hands 
of the management at the earliest possible moment. 
(16) The methane drainage pipe range had been opened up close to the 
out bye wall of the seal in the return so that samples of atmosphere from the 
return could be drawn off at the surface without exposing anyone to the risk 
entailed in collecting them on the spot. This arrangement proved very 
successful and samples taken in tlus way showed that about three-quarters of 
an hour after the blast I I per cent. of firedamp was present in the return and 
that it rose to just over 20 per cent. one hour after the blast. Air samples were 
drawn (and analysed) from this pipe at regular intervals until it was re-connected 
with the inbye methane drainage range at 1.30 p.m. on Monday, 25th July, a 
few hours before the explosion. All these samples were analysed for carbon 
monoxide but "NI L "  results were obtained except on three occasions, all 
within eleven minutes of the blast, when small percentages were found (0,034, 
0·011 and 0·003), and these were considered (rightly I think) to have originated 
from the firing of the explosive. 
(17) r consider that as soon as the water had drained away from the flIe 
seals some air started to circulate through them. The doors in No. 1 East Air 
Crossing had been deliberately left open when the districts were sealed up in 
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January. so that once the seals were breached very little ventilation pressure 
would be needed to cause some air to How in the drifts. By 10 a.m. on 
Sunday, 17th July. air measurements indicated that 2,100 cubic feet per minute 
were passing in through the intake sea] and indeed samples containing up to 
68 per cent. methane \\-ere collected at the ., Breach in the Return Stopping ". 
By noon the quantity had risen to 5,500 cubic feet per minute. I t  was not, 
however, until the afternoon of Monday, 18th July. that a really clear passage 
was made through the stopping in the return drift. At the time the seals were 
inserted. doors were built in the drifts near the inbye ends of the stoppings and 
the door in the return had jammed shut. In order to open this door a learn, 
wearing breathing apparatus, had to be sent round through No. 1 East Air 
Crossing into the return drift to take it off its hinges and this was accomplished 
by 3.30 p.m. Meanwhile air measurements taken by the Area Ventilation 
Engineer showed that 6.200 cubic feet  per minute were passing inbye through 
tbe hole in the seal. Whether any of this fresh air reached the face of No. 4 
East at tltis time is problematical since later inspection showed that the doors 
in the air crossing at No. 4 East had been destroyed by an explosion, which it 
would appear, happened when the district was sealed off in January. Later 
the same day, doors in the road connecting the two drifts on the outbye side of 
the stoppings were closed and a .. fresh air base " established at No. I East 
Junction. A rescue leam then explored the main intake and found it flooded 
inbye from No. 3 East Junction and that the edge of the water in the right-hand 
common return was lying at its junction with the Peeler House. The doors at 
No. I East Air Crossing were then closed (in the early hours of Tuesday, 19th 
July) and it was possible to walk down the intake to the edge of the water 
without breathing apparatus. 
(18) In the meantime air samples had been systematically collected (I) from 
the site of the return stopping by means of the methane drainage pipe, 
(2) from the Fan Drift on the surface and (3) a few were also obtained. at much 
longer intervals, from the breach in the return stopping. As already indicated 
the results of the analyses of these samples did not give cause for any uneasiness. 
An additional sampling point was then established in the main return from the 
east side at No. I East Overcast and samples were collected once every hour 
from I a.m. on the 19th July. until I 1  a.m. on the 20th. The analyses again 
seemed to indicate that all was well. In the morning of Wednesday, 20th July, 
the Area Ventilation Engineer took measurements showing there was a current 
of air passing inbye over the water, and that this had risen to 4.700 cubic feet  
per minute. The doors in the Peeler House were replaced by a Rescue Brigade, 
and an electric pump was taken inbye to the edge of the water, arriving on the 
site about 4 p.m. 
(19) There was systematic sampling at four points from that day. The 
results were considered to be satisfactory at the time, but, as shown in Section 7 
of the Report, I consider that the implication of those results was not properly 
appreciated. 
(20) The electric pump was started up at 1.10 a.m. on Thursday. 2 1st  July. 
and at once the level of the water began to fall. At 1 1.25 a.m. the Area 
Production Manager. J. Lawrie, and F. TootIe, H.M. District Inspector of 
Mines, made their way in through the water and reached the intake of No. 4 
East. They found the doors at the air crossing completely smashed on the 
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right-hand side and partly damaged on the left-hand side, and such fresh air 
as was reaching the air crossing appeared to be short circuiting directly into 
the return on the south side. Tests made with a flame safety-lamp showed that 
the flame was extinguished at a point in the intake 30 feet inbye of the air 
crossing. 1t was at this time that signs of a previous explosion, which had 
probably occurred at the time when the district was sealed off in January, were 
found. In addition to the damage to the air crossing doors a stone dust barrier 
installed near the end of the intake was found to be discharged, the planks at 
the outbyc end were lying on the fioor, but those inbye were still in position 
although with no dust left on them. Some metal ventilation tubing which had 
been used before the air crossing had been constructed, and which had been 
left hanging up in the road, was also found flattened. Later the same day a 
canvas screen was erected in an attempt to restrict the leakage through the air 
crossing doors. and the Area Ventilation Engineer, wearing breathing apparatus, 
made a measurement in No. 4 East right-hand return showing that about 700 
cubic feet per minute was coming out. 
(21) On Friday, 22nd July, at 7.30 a.m. an attempt was made to restrict the 
leakage at the doors of No. 3 East and No. 4 East with canvas, and measure­
ments taken by the Area Ventilation Engineer showed that 1 1.000 cubic feet 
per minute were now passing inbye over the water. and 7,500 cubic feet per 
minute were coming out at No. 4 sampling point. The flow in the right-hand 
return of No. 4 East had risen to 2,000 cubic feel per minute. Between 12.25 
and 1.15 p.m. the right-hand return \,as explored by a rescue brigade ,,,earing 
apparatus, who took temperatures getting readings of 72'-' F .  dry bulb, and 7 1° F. 
\,ct bulb. Work continued to improve the doors at the overcast. At 2 p.m. 
another rescue team moved a tub, filled with rubbish from under the" back 
brushing" in the common return, which had been a considerable obstruction 
to the free now of air in the return. This brigade then explored the intake of 
No. 4 East. In the evening another rescue brigade collected samples from the 
left-hand return when it was estimated that about 1,000 cubic feet per minute 
were coming outbye and being diluted with a leakage of approximately 3,000 
cubic feet per minute of fresh air at the air crossing. Between 6,45 and 7.25 p.m. 
a rescue team went into the face of No. 4 East left-hand return. and by using 
their electric lamps wer� able to see down the face as far as the cutting machine. 
Everything seemed to be in order, the atmosphere was clear and the props were 
standing. 
(22) On the same day special air samples were collected in the No. 4 East 
District. The results, set out in Section V II of the report, show that all except 
one contained carbon monoxide in rneasureable quantities. 
(23) On Saturday, 23rd July, further improvements were effected to various 
doors along the intake, including those between the intake and the \Vest side 
return. 
(24) On Sunday, 24th July, the openings through the stoppings at the 
oulbyc ends of the main drifts were expanded by clearing the passageways up 
to the roof. By I p.m. the return had been dealt with, and by 4 p.m. the intake. 
A measurement made at 8 p.m. that day showed that the amount of air passing 
inbye had increased to 17,752 cubic feet per mjnute. 
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(25) On Monday, 25th July. at 9.30 a.m. an exploration was made by a 
party \\ ithout breathing apparatus. and they were able to get as far as the face 
of No. 4 East intake. The road\\ay thus far was clear of gas, though the 
atmo�phere feh warm. Tests ,I,.lIh 3 flame safety.lamp through the north side 
doors at o. -l air crossing showed that the atmosphere in the left-hand return 
was explosive. The party also travelled the right-hand return finding some 
2 per cent. of firedamp in the general body of the air at the out bye end, rising 
to 3 per cent. in the general body at the road head. A quantity of 11,000 cubic 
feet per minute was passing inbye o\'er the water in the Trunk Road. 
(26) In the afternoon an attempt was made 10 run the methane drainage 
plant in order to draw gas from the left·hand return in No. 4 East. The attempt 
failed, apparently because the pipes were blocked with \\ater. Two mechanics, 
J. Dewar and T. Stenzel, together with W. Murphy. an experienced deputy, 
were sent into the return to sec if they could find out what was wrong, and to 
drain off any accumulation of water they could find. A party consisting of 
W. G. Neilson, the Group Manager, F. Tootlc, District Inspector, J. Henderson, 
an overman and rescue man, W. Hamilton, a deputy. T. Davidson. a deputy, 
A. Bridges, a rescue man, D. SCOll Snr. and D. Scott Jnr., workmen (and two 
other:,) were sent into No. 4 East in order to clear an airway th.rough the fall 
which was known to have occurred on the left bank of the face at the time of 
the fire. The two rescue men wore breathing apparatus but it was nOI .. coupled 
up n. Tootle went with the mechanics into the return and left, after watching 
them for some time. when he was satisfied that they would finish their work 
within a matter of 20 minutes. He then went round and assisted the party at 
the face. By 6.30 p.m. an airway had been opened up through the fall 3 to 
4 feet in width and approximately 18 inches in height. Tootle and Neilson 
crawled through the hole, looked up the face using their cap lamps, and saw 
that conditions appeared to be normal. The atmosphere was clear and the 
props were standing. 
(27) In the meantime the two other workmen had been sent to do further 
repairs at the ventilation doors. These workmen, fortunately for themselves, 
ran out of material and had to return to the surface. In the return the 
mechanics fiad also finished their work on the methane drainage pipes and 
reponed progress to the surface on the telephone at No. 2 West. They received 
instructions from the Deputy Area Production Manager to go back into the 
return and make a further examination of the range. They did so but so far 
as is known they did not take any tools with them on this occasion. The deputy. 
Murphy, again accompanied them. 
(28) Having opened up the passage through the fall the party at the face 
turned for home. and were making their way outbye along No. 4 East intake. 
Such was the slate of affairs immediately before the explosion. 
Vr.-THE EXPLOSION 
(29) As already indicated, the party working on the fall on the left bank of 
the face had made better progress than had been expected. A hole 3 to 4 feet 
in width and 12 inches to 18 inches in height had gradually been opened up 
over the 38 feel to which distance the fall had extended. The quantity of air 
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passing over the fall had gradually increased as the work progressed, and in 
fact had been greatly increased by the time it was finished. Beyond the fall 
everything appeared to be quite normal, the temperature, though warm, did not 
appear to be higher than usual and the ground did not appear to be warm to 
the touch. The \\ hole party made their way outbye more or less leisurely, 
looking for signs of the previous explosion as they \"ent. The two workmen 
had been sent on ahead with instructions to tighten up the doors at No. 4 East 
air crossing, in order to reduce the leakage. As i s  quite understandable under 
the circumstances none of the survivors is now able to say in what order the 
party was proceeding, and indeed all are not quite certain whether or not they 
had passed the air crossing when the explosion occurred, though the balance 
of the evidence leads me to believe they were in fact between the air crossing and 
the Trunk Road. All are agreed, however, that they were suddenly enveloped 
in name, thst there was a tremendous concussion and that they were thrown 
about violently. Onc of the first to recover his senses was Bridges. one 
of the rescue men, whose lamp unfortunately was broken. He found himself 
in an atmosphere of smoke and dust. He was wearing breathing apparatus, 
although it was not coupled up, and his arm having been injured he was unable 
to turn on the oxygen. He shouted and hearing a reply crawled in the direction 
of the voices. He found two persons, one of whom was Henderson. Bridges 
managed to switch on Henderson's oxygen supply, but Henderson's hands 
were so badly burned that he could not do ukewise for Bridges, who had to 
instruct the other man how to turn on the oxygen. Bridges then fixed his nose 
clip and mouthpiece, and after taking a few breaths of oxygen recovered and 
became clear hcaded again. Bridges then shouted telling everyone to switch 
on their cap lamps, but the visibility was very bad owing to the amount of 
dust in the air. He then gave the second man oxygen from his apparatus for 
a short timc. Recollecting that if he kept the gate belt on his right-hand side 
he would be going oulbye. he shouted this to all the others who could hear 
him and set off. However, he soon found that they were going in the wrong 
direction and turned back. Tootle, who had been examining some dust on the 
web of a girder, was badly injured about the face at the time of the explosion 
and was found in a semi-conscious state sitting on the floor. Bridges helped 
Tootlc out on to the Trunk Road where they found the atmosphere clear. 
Another man was ::.itling on the trunk belt in a dazed condition, and Bridges 
revived him by shaking him and indicated the way out. All were burned and 
badly shocked. Neilson and Henderson were left silting on the trunk belt near 
No. 4 East Junction while the others straggled out bye. At this time they were 
quite unaware that the three other men were still in the return. Meanwhile 
D. SCOlt Jnr. who had preceded the main party, carrying reviving apparatus 
with him, had reached No. 3 East Junction when the explosion occurred. The 
force of the explosion blew him to the floor and he lost the reviving apparatus. 
He picked himself up and made his way out to the telephone at No. 2 West 
where he found F. McTigue. He told McTigue to telephone to the surface and 
let them know what had happened. McTigue, who was at the telephone at 
the time says that he was also knocked over by the explosion and when he 
recovered himself he telephoned to the surface and informed them that there 
had been a terrific blast and that help was needed. 
(30) W. Adams, a Rescue Brigade [nstructor, arrived at the colliery at 
6.55 p.m. to take charge of the rescue" cover " for the oncoming shift. As be 
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walked into the Incident Room the telephone rang, and when he answered it a 
voice said" Blast, need assistance, J am choking ". He did not know who 
spoke, nor where the message came from because the person making the call 
immediately rang off. He at once told the four rescue men and J. Simpson, the 
Jnstructor, who had been standing by from the previous shift, to go straight 
down underground and give what assistance they could. He then telephoned 
the Coat bridge Central Rescue Station saying there had been an explosion at 
Cardowan and asked for assistance. On coming out of the Incident Room at 
approximately 7 p.m. he met W. Dyer, the Rescue Station Superintendent, , .. ho 
instructed him to go underground with the others. Adams put on his apparatus, 
arranged for reviving apparatus to be sent underground and proceeded inbye 
with the others. At the intake stopping he met two men whose names he did 
not know, but whom he could see had been involved in the incident, and he 
llJowed them to carry on outbye. The doors at No. I East air crossing were 
found blown open. Adams had been informed of the three men in the return 
lDd having seen all the survivors on their way outbye, he realised that three men 
were still unaccounted for and that they must be those in the return airway. 
A.n attempt was made to enter the return airway at No. 3 East but the owrcast 
aad been destroyed, the roof of the resulting ca,·ity was still falling hea"ily so 
:hat it was not possible to get into the return at that point. The six·man learn 
Has then split up into two parties, one going in through the Peeler House and 
:he other round through the doors at No. 4 East air crossing. The men going 
:hrough the Peeler House found the three bodies of Murphy. Stcnzel and Dcwar 
n the return between the right·hand return and the back brushing at the points 
1\, B and C, indicated on the plan. 
(31) The injured persons having been removed to the :-.urface the work of 
'ecovering the bodies was then organised. and within half an hour the last body 
lad been brought out on to the Trunk Road. The flame safety. lamp belonging 
o Murphy, the deputy, was found lying on the floor in the return near the back 
")rushing. and it was recovered and taken to the surface. Signs of blast were 
;een in the Peeler House indicating that the blast came from the return towards 
,he intake. A stool near the junction of the riglll.hand return with the common 
'eturn had been blown into the right·hand return. seeming to indicate that the 
,last had come out along the common return. The door:) at No.4 East air 
!rossing had again been completely destroyed, but the direction of the blast 
Nas not noted in the limited time while the Rescue Brigade men were looking 
'or the bodies. A hutch of dirt in the common return near No.4 East air 
:Tossing seemed to have been moved in an inbye direction. but there is some 
loubl about this as its precise position before the explosion is not known. 
fh.ree flame safety·lamps. one cap lamp and the canary cage were found in 
'Jo. 4 East intake road within a few yards of the junction with the Trunk Road. 
rheir positions were noted, though they were not recovered. and they seem to 
odicate lhe whereabouLS of the survivors when they were overwhelmed by the 
xplosion. 
(32) As soon as the bodies had been brought to the surface it was decided 
hat in view of the danger of another explosion the district should be abandoned 
nd the seals replaced at the foot of the main drifts. The passageways through 
he stoppings were filled in with sandbags by 7 a.m. on the 26th July, and the 
eals finally completed by I p.m. on Saturday, 30th July. 
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VlI.-AlR SAMPLING AND ITS RESULTS 
(a) Systematic samples collected 20ch-251h July 
(33) From midday on Wednesday, 20th July, systemalic sampling was 
establi�hcd at points marked 1, 2, 3 aDd 4, on the plan. Sampling at point No. 1 
was Slopped arter 2.30 a.m. tbe next morning. These air samples were taken 
by rescue brigade men who had been trained not to operate the relief valves on 
their breathing apparatus \\ hen there "as any possiblhty that such action might 
vitiate the samples. Bladders were inflated by taking increments sy:,tematicaUy 
over the cro�s section of the roadway so that a representative sample of the 
.. general body" of the atmosphere was obtained. The results of the analyses 
of thc�e sample!' arc shown on the three graphs. At first samples were taken 
every (wo hours and the results of analyses gave no cause for concern until the 
early hours of Thulsday, 21st July, when 0·0013 per cent. of carbon monoxide 
wa') found in a sample from No. 3 Point, i.e., in the right-hand return from 
No. 4 Easl. From that time on until tbe explosion it was only on rare occasions 
that" NIL" or e,en" trace" resullS were obtained from this airway. It is 
truc that the perccluages were never anything but small but their presence at 
all should. I tllink, ha,e led those responsible to look more closely into the 
matter. When the percentages of carbon monoxide and the oxygen deficiencies 
are as small as these \\ere. it is really doubtful if a reliable and truly indicative 
figure can be obtained when the .• ratio" is \\orked out. I do feel, however, 
that they \\ere .. stra\\s in the wind" and that they should have been followed 
up, not only by sampling at shorter intenals. but by attempts to obtain other 
samples tak.en at different points in the cross-section of the roads and at points 
nearer to the site of the January fire. Jt is contended that this carbon monoxide 
\\as a constituent of the gases left in the wastes after the fire and explosion in 
January but I cannot altogether accept this. A glance at the graphs shows that 
the shapcs of the" cunes " for methane and carbon dio:\.ide are substantially 
SImilar, I.e., that when one is high the other is high and when one is lower the 
other is lowcr. The shape of the carbon monoxide cunes are however quite 
different, clearly indicating that this gas was not a .. residual ". Moreover, it  
has been calculated that the total volume of atmosphere enclosed within the 
seals was something between I f and 2 million cubic feet. As already noted, 
some 40 million cubic feet of firedamp were drained from the area during the 
time the seals were in position so that in effect the" bottle" must have been 
.. washed out" about 20 times and the likelihood of any residual carbon 
monoxide remaining at the time of re-opening is indeed rcmote. 
(34) The Kilsylh Coking Coal is not regarded as being subject to spontaneous 
heating so I am convinced that fresh air was coming into contact with 
carbonaceous matter which was at such a temperature that oxidation was 
taking place. Once oxidation starts the temperature rises causing in its turn 
an increasc in the rate of oxidation and, unless the flow of air is sufficiently 
great to carry away the heat thus generated, open combustion eventually results. 
Something of this nature was, J Hunk. happening on either or both banks of 
No. 4 East face-probably on or near the edge of the waste. Apart from the 
members of the party who cleared a passage for the air over the fall on the 
left bank. no one had examined or even travelled the face, and fresh air had 
had access to it for several days. 
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(35) It was said that No. 4 sampling point was chosen because it was readily 
accessible to men wearing breathing apparatus. While this is a valid 
consideration, the site was open to considerable objection on the ground that 
very heavy leakage of fresh air was taking place at No.4 East Air Crossing, 
thus diluting the atmosphere in the return and rendering the detection and 
measurement of carbon monoxide much more difficult. Under prevailing 
circumstances, and indeed in any case where firedamp is being cleared from an 
area after a fire has been smothered by sealing off, it should be recognised that 
nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of collecting the most informative 
samples of the atmosphere. Had samples been collected from the Left-hand 
Return of No. 4 East it is not allogether improbable that a much more definite 
picture of the state of affairs on the Left Bank of the face would have been 
obtained. As it was, the « traces" and small percentages of carbon monoxide 
which were found should have excited more interest and curiosity. 'In this 
particular road only a very small amount of air was circulating and high 
percentages of firedamp were present. The road rose gently towards the face 
and the face itself rose gently from the intake up to the left-hand corner. 
(36) Observations by the Area Ventilation Engineer wearing breathing 
apparatus made as late as Monday morning (the day of the explosion) in No. 4 
East Left-hand Return showed that the atmosphere in the upper part of the 
road was stagnant; while there was a flow, estimated to lie between 500 and 
1,000 cubic feet per minute, along the floor of the road. 11 is a pity that spot 
samples were not taken entirely from this moving current instead of from the 
general body of the air. They might well have been much more informative. 
(b) Additional Samples in No. 4 East District, 22nd July 
(37) As already explained, special samples were collected from No. 4 East 
District on 22nd July. 
(38) Shortly after midday half-a-dozen samples were taken spaced out at 
intervals along the right-hand return; about 3 p.m. three wcre taken similarly 
in No. 4 East Intake and about 7 p.m. three (one at the face. one midway and 
one at the outbye cnd) were collected from the left-hand return. The results 
of the analyses are set out in the table below:-
Sampling Poin/-No. 4 East Righl Reil/m 01 12.45 p.m. 
CO, CO 0, N, CH.. Black CO,02 
Damp Del Ratio Remw·J..s 
1 ·91 0·0008 9·79 42 ·63 45·67 7·57 0·0005 At face 
1 ·91 0'OOt4 10· 11 43·85 44·13 7·55 0·0009 150' from face 
1·95 0·(XH5 10'04 44·27 43·74 8·28 0·0009 300' .. .. 
1 ·62 0'002t 12· 12 51·17 35·09 7·01 0·0015 500' " " 
1 ·40 0·0011 13·16 55·15 30·29 6·83 0·0008 700' " " 
0·96 0·0010 15·82 63'43 19·79 4·60 0·0010 900' .. " 
Sampling Point-No. 4 East Main Intake at Jp.",. 
2 · 02 0·0009 8·61 37·92 51·45 7·43 0·0006 At face 
O' 15 0-0003 20·57 78·67 0·61 1·09 0·0012 450' from (ace 
0·06 NIL 20·80 79·03 O· 11 0·51 NIL 900' " .. 
Sampling Point-No. 4 East uft Relurn 01 7 p.",. 
2·95 0·0005 I ·08 1 I . 11 84·80 9·99 0·0003 At (ace 
2·98 0·0005 I . J2 9·42 86'48 8·14 0·0004 450' from face 
2· 94 0·0007 5'46 30·42 6t'18 12·70 0·0003 900' " " 
It wiU be noted that all except one contained carbon monoxide in measureable 
quantity. 
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(c) General Comments all Sampling Procedure 
(39) The samples. other than those drawn off from the methane drainage 
pipe, were collected in bladders which were inflated by a hand·opcrated syringe. 
At the chosen places increments were collected from different points carefulJy 
di!ttributed over the cross·section of the roadway. a squeeze of the bulb being 
gl\cn at each pOint. This ensured that a representative sample of the general 
body was obtained. The samples were collected by rescue men wearing Proto 
self·contalned breathing apparatus. who had been trained not to use their relief 
valves while ta�ing them. 
(40) It wa') known that the atmosphere in the left·hand return of No. 4 East 
contained a high percentage of firedamp and that only a small quantity of air 
was circulating. The flow of air was confined 10 Ihe lower part of the cross· 
section of the roadway. Had samples been laken entirely from this moving 
air current it l!t possible that much morc informative results would have been 
obtained. Those increments laken from the upper parts of the road. being 
moslly stagnant methane, had not passed over the site of the fire and merely 
served to dilute the increments of atmosphere which had. The net result was 
to reduce the percentage of carbon monoxide in the sample and to render its 
I11C3<;urement a more difficulL maller for the chemi�l. The <;ame applied to 
samplc� taken in the right-hand return, particularly in the earlier stage�. As 
the quantity of air passing increased, so of cour!le, did the dilution by fre:;h air, 
but samples takcn from near the floor might have been ea!lier from the chemist's 
point of view. 
(41) In vic\  of thc amounts of carbon monoxidc which \'vere found it is a 
pity that attempt... \\ere not made to di!lcovcr their origm by sampling further 
Inbyc, c\en to the extent of going on to the face for them. 
(42) Analysi'i was carried out on a Graham La\\Tcnce apparatus which 
enabled the carbon monoxide content to be detenmncd to \ ithlO 0·0002 per 
cent. I am satir;;ficd that the result� of the analyses wele made available as soon 
a ... possible. 
\'Ill. COMMENTS ON HIE PLANNING OF THE RE-OPENING 
OPERATIONS 
(43) The exploration and, in particular. the re·establishment of the 
ventilation appears to have been carried Qut on an (Id "oc basis and there 
seems to have been little sense of urgency. The plans for breaching lhe 
stopping!; in the drifts \'vere excellent and had been laid do" n beforehand in 
detail, but what was to happen after that seems to have been left to be decided 
upon in the light of the state of affairs at the time. The result was delay. 
amounting to days. in restoring the ventilation and in clearing the accessible 
workings of firedamp. The contours of the area were known and flooding of 
the air\\ays in the .. swilley" should have been anticipated and the necessary 
pumping gear should ha\e been ready. It does not seem to have been realised 
that once fresh air reached the top of the drifts it would flow downhill under 
the lighter. less densc. firedamp and that it would not all enter the return where 
the doors at No. I East Air Crossing had been left open in January. For lack 
of a definite plan to restore the ventilation right into No.4 East on a fixed 
time·table of "ours, together with the provision of the necessary materials to 
14 
seal off leakage at the various connections between intake and return, a period 
of no less than nine days elapsed before anything approaching a sufficient 
volume of air was supplied to begin to clear the gas from the rise side of No. 4 
East District. Had the plan been to clear the roadways in stages (as it might 
very well have been in view of the large volume of firedamp involved) this could 
have been settled beforehand; the points at which temporary stoppings were 
to be erected decided upon and the necessary materials provided. (This method 
was adopted successfully in 1926 at Birchenwood Colliery in Staffordshire)·,  
Even if it  was intended to make one clean sweep J am unable to understand 
why progress was not more rapid. It has long been recognised as a cardinal 
principle when a working is to be cleared of firedamp that gas and air must not 
be allowed to mix slowly and that the gas should be removed as nearly as 
possible in the form of a .. plug " and a close examination made immediately 
00 its " heels ". This is particularly important when the gas has accumulated 
because the area has had to be sealed up in order to smother a fire. 10 these 
circumstances there is no air current to carry away the heat generated by the 
fire and it can only disappear by dissipation into and through the strata. As 
ordinary coal measure rocks are very poor conductors of heat this process is 
of necessity a slow and lengthy business, and indeed i f  the fire has been one of 
some magnitude it  is questionable if a period of six months is sufficient to allow 
the surroundings to cool to something approaching normal strata temperature. 
If one bears in mind the fact that very few substances oxidise more rapidly than 
:oal, particularly " half burned " coal or .• half coked " coal, when it is only 
;lightly warm, the importance of this rate of cooling becomes apparent. 
IX.-CONCLUSIONS 
(44) Sufficient evidence to ascertain the ex.act cause and course of the 
!xplosion is not available. The only persons to travel the affected parts of the 
mine arter the ex.plosion were the survivors and the rescue brigades. The 
mrvivors, quite understandably, were in no shape to make detailed observations. 
The rescue brigades were, quite rightly, pre-occupied with their prime task of 
;earching for survivors and recovering the bodies of the dead men. They are, 
however, to be commended on the extent to which they did observe useful signs 
while going about their business. ]n these circumstances any conclusions must 
of necessity be largely a matter of opinion. 
(45) fn my opinion firedamp was ignited somewhere on the face of No. 4 
East District by the reheating of carhonaceous material which had been on fire 
.n January. The explosion spread outbye through the district and up the 
:ommon return airway increasing in violence as it went. h had, however, died 
jown very considerably by the time it  reached No. I East Air Crossing where i t  
merely blew open the doors. 1 am also satisfied that although an elecrrically­
iriven pump was i n  use in the intake, effective steps were taken to ensure that 
;urrent was nol supplied to any cables or apparatus beyond it. The safelY-
mps used by the party working i n  the return were recovered and thoroughly 
!xamined, and I am satisfied that they were not the cause of ignition. 
(46) In relation to the presence of firedamp progress in stopping substantial 
eakages through the various connections between intake and return seems to 
ve been slow and somewhat haphazard. Although some air had been 
• See Transactions of Institution of MifHng Engineers., Vol. 75, page 62. 
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travelling along the right bank of No. 4 East face, it would have little effect on 
the accumulation in the waste. The fall of roof on the left bank materially 
restricted the flow of air to such an extent that the left· hand return contained 
a high percentage of firedamp shortly before the explosion. As a passage for 
the air was cleared over and through the fall on the left bank the amount 
passing out of the left·hand return was increased. and so a steadily increasing 
amount of firedamp was carried out through the common return. The 
increased now of air along the left bank may well have been accompanied by a 
corresponding decrease on the right bank, and it is just possible that this 
resulted in the concentration of firedamp therein passing into the explosive 
range. I am also satisfied that sufficient firedamp was present on the face to 
cause name to come out of the intake as far as its junction with the trunk road 
when it  exploded. It was not necessary to have an explosi\e mixture in either 
or both the returns from No.4 East to account for the known extent of the 
explosion. It is obvious that there was an explosive mixture in the common 
return. 
(47) A large number of air samples were taken and analysed without delay. 
The results did not cause alarm at the time, but although the percentages of 
carbon monoxide and the oxygen deficiencies were too small to enable reliable 
and informative ratios to be calculated, the concentrations of carbon monoxide 
were often definitely above normal level. The method of coUecting the air 
samples ensured a representative sample of the general body of the air in the 
roadway at the sampling points but r consider that it left something to be 
desired in the circumstances. The presence of the carbon monoxide should 
have prompted a review of the situation of the sampling points and of the 
method of collecting the individual samples. 
(48) It is  well known that half burned coal or half coked coal are very 
liable to reheat spontaneously when exposed to fresh air, especially if the 
temperature is  slightly above the normal. The rate of reheating is slow at first 
but accelerates very rapidly in its later stages, especially as the point of open 
conflagration is  reached. In the present case, fresh air reached the No. 4 East 
District (al any rate the out bye parts of it) very soon after the seals were 
breached, and some of it traversed both sides of No. 4 East face for several 
days. During lllis time there was ample opportunity for reheating to start and 
develop. I consider that it is  very much more likely that this happened than 
that the igniting cause originated in something which was done by the men 
working in the return. 
(49) The deputy and two mechanics who lost their lives at the time of the 
explosion were sent to work in the return while large accumulations of firedamp 
still existed on roadways on the inbye side of them. Wrule they were i n  the 
return work was in progress to clear the fall of roof on the face, which might 
well have sent gas on to them. 
(50) Rescue men, with breathing apparatus, were used to provide support 
for persons working underground and, at least at the time of the explosion, 
they accompanied them closely. I consider it would have been better practice 
for the rescue men to have remained not too far away but under cover in some 
shelter so as to avoid the risk of their being all overwhelmed simultaneously. 
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X.-RECOMME 'DATIONS 
(SI) Because of the scarcity of concrete evidence J must again emphasise 
that my findings are largely a matter of opinion. 10 this particular case due 
regard was paid to many of the follo\\'ing recommendations but 1 have included 
them in order to draw attention to items which, obvious though they may appear 
when read in the calm atmosphere of everyday life, may well be overlooked in 
the stress of an actual re-opening operation. 
:t) Planning of Re-opening Operations 
All phases of work involved in re-opening a district which has been sealed 
Jff following a fire, and in restoring conditions to normal, should be covered 
by a detailed plan, drawn up in consultation with all interested parties. This 
plan should not be varied materially, except as may be necessary to deal with 
:In emergency, without fresh consultation with those parties. The scheme 
should provide for the appointment of one senior official to be in charge of all 
operations on each shift, and for the provision of ample supplies of necessary 
materials and apparatus such as tools, canvas braltice, materials for temporary 
itoppings, etc. 
[2) Timing of Re-opening Operations 
Great care is needed in deciding \\ hen to attempt to re-open a district which 
has been sealed off because of fire. A period of longer than six months may 
well be necessary to allow heated material, particularly coal, to cool down 
sufficiently. Firedamp will be present in large quantities and in order to ensure 
that its concentration does nol fall into the explosive range it is necessary to 
consider whether to attempt to recover the whole of the affected area in  one 
stage, or whether to proceed in several stages. 
(3) Restoration of the Ventilation 
Th.is must always be treated as a matter of the greatest urgency. As far .as 
possible, accumulations of inflammable gas should be removed as a " plug " 
and not diluted with fresh air until they are well clear of any ground which may 
have been affected by the fire. All possible sources of ignition in the path of 
the gas must be eliminated. The possibility of an exploration by a team wearing 
�elf-contained breathing apparatus and operating through an air lock, should 
be considerea before any attempt is made to restore the ventilation. Steps 
should be taken to ensure that electric power cannot be supplied to cables or 
signalling apparatus in  the affected part of the mine until the ventilation has 
been completely restored. 
(4) Sampling 'he Atmosphere 
The scheme referred to in paragraph (I) above should include the provision 
of suitable laboratory equipment on the surface at the mine for the analyses of 
air samples, in particular for estimating percentage concentrations of carbon 
[IDonoxidc to four places of decimals. 11 should also include the specification 
of points where air samples should be taken at fixed intervals, bearing in  mind 
that the most significant results will be obtained by taking samples near to any 
possible, or suspected, site of heating, and that separate spot samples should be 
taken at different points in  the cross section of a roadway in which only a small 
quantity of air is flowing. The resuhs of the analyses of these samples should 
be plotted at the earliest possible moment on a graph, in such a way that the 
percentages of the different gases at any time are plainly indicated. These 
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graphs should be kepi constantly available to Ihe manager and the senior 
officials. Where air samples are collected by men wearing breathing apparatus 
they should be instructed how to avoid contamination with gas exhausted from 
the relief valve of their apparatus. In  every case where carbon monoxide is 
found 10 measureable quantity, and where the oxygen deficiency can be reliably 
determined their ratio should be calculated and shown on the graph. 
(5) Safeguarding of Personnel during Re�opel1illg Operations 
A physical examination of the dlstrict should be made as the fresh air first 
advances, and no one should be allo\\ed to work without breathing apparatus 
in a return airway until the whole area is clear of accumulations of gas. The 
number of men working underground at any time should be kept down to the 
absolute minimum. Where a rescue brigade is used underground as support 
for worh.men it should remain in some place, not too far away from where the 
work is proceeding. but under sufficient cover as will make it unhkely that the 
rescue mcn would be seriously affected should an explosion occur. Considera� 
lion should be given to the possibility of providing .< self· rescuers ", i.e., small 
gas ma�ks which give protection to the wearer against carbon monoxide, for 
all persons engaged underground in re�opening operations where there is any 
risk of explosion. 
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